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The	myth	of	polarisation	in	Northern	Ireland:
rethinking	claims	that	instability	is	due	to	increased
polarisation	caused	by	power-sharing
Matthew	Whiting	and	Stefan	Bauchowitz	argue	that	the	assumption	that
power-sharing	entrenches	polarisation	is	not	the	reality	that	many	think	it	is.	By
examining	legislator	voting	records,	speeches	by	party	leaders,	manifestos	and
public	opinion	data,	they	find	that	overall	polarisation	declined.	They	suggest	that
instability	is	instead	caused	by	parties	in	Northern	Ireland	being	encouraged	by
Westminster	to	adopt	positions	of	brinksmanship	as	electoral	strategies.
In	January	2020,	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	restarted	after	a	three-year	collapse.	The	reopening	was	a
subdued	affair	and	took	place	more	with	trepidation	than	fanfare.	This,	of	course,	was	not	the	Assembly’s	first
collapse.	It	had	already	been	suspended	on	four	occasions	(once	for	3	months,	twice	for	24	hours,	and	once	for	five
years)	since	it	was	established	as	part	of	the	Belfast	Agreement	peace	deal	in	1998.
The	most	recent	collapse	ostensibly	occurred	over	the	DUP’s	role	in	a	shockingly	badly	managed	renewable	energy
scheme,	but	it	was	also	grounded	in	a	long-standing	cultural	conflict	between	Sinn	Féin	and	the	DUP.	The	DUP
were	also	refusing	to	pass	an	Irish	language	act	because,	in	the	words	of	First	Minister	Arlene	Foster,	‘if	you	feed
the	crocodile	it	will	keep	coming	back	for	more’.	This	came	on	top	of	other	divisions,	including:	localised	rioting	over
flags	and	parades;	stalemate	over	how	to	deal	with	the	legacy	of	the	conflict;	and,	of	course,	Brexit	where	88%	of
nationalists	voted	‘Remain’	compared	to	34%	of	unionists.
For	many,	this	political	instability	is	an	ugly	reminder	that	Northern	Ireland	remains	polarised	despite	the	successes
of	the	peace	process.	In	fact,	according	to	some	critics	the	peace	deal	may	even	have	fed	into	this	polarisation.
They	argue	that	while	the	peace	process	eliminated	violence	by	offering	Sinn	Féin	a	share	of	power,	power-sharing
actually	encourages	leaders	to	neglect	bread-and-butter	issues	in	favour	of	entrenched	ethnic	politics	so	they	can
win	as	many	votes	from	their	community	as	possible.
Confronting	the	myth	of	polarisation
Confronted	with	this	picture,	we	set	out	to	measure	whether	Northern	Ireland	was	really	polarised	or	not,	how	rates
of	polarisation	may	have	changed	since	between	1998	and	today,	and	what	policy	areas	might	be	more	polarised
than	others.
First,	we	examined	if	Northern	Ireland’s	politics	was	exclusively	about	identity	issues	and	the	peace	process	or	if
other	issues	emerged.	We	found	that	the	Northern	Irish	experience	actually	defies	claims	that	power-sharing
entrenches	identity	politics	at	the	expense	of	‘bread-and-butter’	issues.	We	reviewed	all	votes	in	the	Assembly
between	1998-2018	and	reviewed	the	Assembly	election	manifestos	of	the	five	biggest	parties	for	the	same	time
period.	We	found	that	identity	and	cultural	politics	never	actually	made	up	more	than	a	third	of	issues	and	it	was
usually	closer	to	20-25%.	Instead,	issues	related	to	the	economy	and	the	welfare	state	were	given	much	more
emphasis.
Secondly,	we	explored	to	what	extent	politicians	were	polarised	and	in	what	policy	areas	only	to	find	that	the
Assembly	was	only	polarised	once	and	this	was	actually	when	it	functioned	best.	We	examined	every	vote	in	the
Assembly	from	1998-2018	(but	we	could	not	examine	the	second	Assembly	from	2002-2007	as	there	was	only
eight	votes	before	it	was	suspended).	By	looking	at	how	MLAs	voted,	we	placed	them	in	a	two-dimensional	space
to	see	how	far	apart	they	were	from	other	MLAs	of	their	own	party	and	how	far	apart	they	were	from	MLAs	of	other
parties.	In	the	Westminster	system,	these	two	dimensions	would	probably	be	an	economic	left-right	and	a	socially
liberal-socially	conservative	left-right.	However,	in	Northern	Ireland	the	main	dimension	is	most	likely	a	nationalist-
unionist	one	and	the	second	weaker	dimension	is	most	likely	an	aggregate	economic	and	social	left-right.
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Each	symbol	represents	the	position	of	one	MLA.	We	are	particularly	interested	in	the	DUP	(triangles)	and	Sinn
Féin	(squares).	In	a	highly	polarised	system,	you	would	expect	all	members	of	the	same	party	to	be	very	tightly
bunched	together	and	for	the	parties	to	be	as	far	away	from	each	other	as	possible.	Looking	at	the	most	important
first	dimension,	MLAs	were	only	polarised	during	the	fourth	Assembly	(2011-16).	Yet	this	was	the	most	productive
of	all	Assemblies	when	the	DUP	came	in	from	the	cold,	when	Martin	McGuinness	and	Ian	Paisley	were	labelled	the
Chuckle	Brothers,	and	when	the	Assembly	passed	the	most	legislation	in	its	20-year	history.	What	is	more,	the	fifth
Assembly	(2016-17)	was	when	MLAs	were	least	polarised	but	this	was	also	when	it	collapsed	for	three	years.
We	also	examined	manifestos	to	see	how	far	apart	parties	were	in	different	policy	areas.	We	found	that	when	it
came	to	economic	issues,	the	welfare	state,	and	the	peace	process,	there	was	no	polarisation.	Instead,	parties
converged	on	a	left-of-centre	position	and	on	supporting	the	peace	process	(especially	after	2007).	There	was
some	polarisation	over	whether	Northern	Ireland	should	remain	in	the	UK	or	not	and	on	other	identity	issues.	But
these	were	of	very	low	salience	and	hardly	mentioned	at	all.
We	also	looked	at	leaders’	speeches	to	their	annual	conference	to	see	if	they	ramped	up	their	positions	when
talking	to	grassroots	supporters.	However,	again	we	found	a	pattern	of	convergence	and	no	polarisation.	There
were	moments	where	parties	pulled	further	apart	from	each	other,	but	these	were	temporary	before	returning	to	a
stronger	pattern	of	convergence.
Finally,	we	looked	at	mass	attitudes	and	behaviour	and	again	we	found	no	evidence	of	polarisation.	When	it	came
to	economic	policies,	the	people	of	Northern	Ireland	converged	on	a	left-of-centre	position.	There	was	not	even	any
mass	polarisation	when	it	came	to	controversial	issues	like	the	display	of	murals	and	flags	by	other	communities.
There	was	also	a	dramatic	decline	in	the	number	of	sectarian	crimes	over	the	20-year	period.	Of	course,	Catholics
remain	far	more	likely	to	identify	as	Irish	nationalists	and	Protestants	as	British	unionists,	but	there	was	a	large	rise
in	those	who	identify	with	neither	community	and	a	rise	in	issues	that	cut	across	the	sectarian	divide	(such	as
LGBT+	issues,	abortion	rights,	and	the	environment).
If	it	is	not	polarisation,	why	is	Northern	Ireland	sometimes	unstable?
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While	we	found	no	polarisation	in	the	sense	that	critics	would	predict,	there	can	be	no	denying	that	the	Assembly
has	been	suspended	four	times,	it	collapsed	as	recently	as	January	2017,	and	Northern	Ireland	struggles	to	deal
with	its	past.	So	if	it	is	not	down	to	polarisation,	what	explains	this?
We	suggest	that	the	parties	in	Northern	Ireland	adopt	positions	of	brinksmanship	as	electoral	strategies	and	they
are	encouraged	to	do	so	because	Westminster	creates	a	moral	hazard	for	this.	In	the	crowded	electoral	space	of
post-conflict	Northern	Ireland,	and	with	rigid	block	voting,	electoral	differentiation	became	the	key	to	success.	Under
these	conditions,	Sinn	Féin	and	the	DUP	made	clear	commitments	to	the	peace	process,	but	also	played	up	their
historically	hardline	images	to	gain	votes	over	their	moderate	rivals.
As	self-described	guarantors	of	the	peace	process,	the	British	role	has	largely	been	to	oversee	it	from	a	distance.
However,	any	time	the	peace	process	looked	in	jeopardy,	successive	governments	under	Tony	Blair,	Gordon
Brown	and	David	Cameron	granted	political	or	financial	support	(often	at	the	urging	of	the	government	in	Dublin	and
local	parties).	After	signing	a	confidence	and	supply	agreement	with	Theresa	May,	the	DUP	were	further
emboldened	that	they	could	extract	concessions	from	Westminster	as	needed.	This	meant	that	the	local	parties
could	engage	in	brinkmanship	knowing	they	would	not	necessarily	pay	the	price	for	their	actions	and	that	a	safety
net	of	concessions	was	usually	available.	In	other	words,	pushing	the	system	to	the	point	of	collapse	was	strategic
rather	than	down	to	ideological	polarisation.
Northern	Ireland	may	be	unstable	at	times,	but	we	should	rethink	claims	that	this	is	because	of	increased
polarisation	caused	by	power-sharing.
____________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	authors’	published	work	in	Political	Studies.
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